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Pension Reform from an Economic
Point of View
Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise
Most social security systems around the world are operated on a pay-as-
you-go (or PAYGO) basis. Taxes collected from working people today are
routed directly to pay the beneﬁts of current retirees. Now these systems
are faced with rapidly aging populations, increasing the number of retirees
relative to the number of persons in the labor force. In addition, employees
in most countries are leaving the labor force at younger and younger ages,
further increasing the ratio of retirees to employed persons. The combina-
tion of these two trends, together with generous retirement beneﬁts in
many countries, has placed social security systems around the world under
enormous ﬁnancial stress. Most social security systems face large un-
funded liabilities. Without changes in the systems, the prospect is for rap-
idly increasing tax rates on the young to pay for beneﬁts for the old. What
is more, in many countries the young are likely to receive beneﬁts when
they retire that are substantially lower than beneﬁts promised today. It
seems inevitable that the young will have to consume less to save for their
own retirement while at the same time paying the beneﬁts of current retir-
ees. The goal of this paper is to explain the nature of the problem faced
by social security systems and then to describe the various approaches
that might be used to address the problem, commenting on the economic
features of each.
Jonathan Gruber is professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and a research associate and director of the program on children at the National Bureau of
Economic Research. David A. Wise is the John F. Stambaugh Professor of Political Economy
at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and director of health
and retirement programs at the National Bureau of Economic Research.
The authors have beneﬁted from the detailed and careful comments of Jeﬀ Liebman and
from data provided by Andrew Samwick.
492.1 What Is the Problem?
We ﬁrst consider the demographic and labor force trends that have
placed ﬁnancial pressure on social security systems. We then discuss spe-
ciﬁc features of PAYGO systems that provide a background for discussion
of reform proposals. We give particular attention to the critical provisions
of most social security programs that induce employees to leave the labor
force at increasingly younger ages. Removing these features can be an im-
portant component of almost any reform proposal.
2.1.1 Demographic and Labor Force Trends
Suppose that the social security taxes paid today are just enough to pay
the beneﬁts of today’s retirees. As long as the number of retirees does not
grow faster than total earnings of employees, the tax receipts can continue
to pay the beneﬁts of retirees. That is not the case today, however. Babies
born after World War II—the baby boomers—are now approaching re-
tirement age. The number of retirees is now increasing very rapidly relative
to the number of younger persons in the workforce. In addition, persons
are living longer, so that those who reach retirement age will be receiving
beneﬁts longer than they used to. The ratio of the number of persons aged
sixty-ﬁve and higher to the number aged twenty to sixty-four is shown in
ﬁgure 2.1, now and in future years, for ten countries.1 The increase is strik-
ing in almost every country. In Japan, with the most rapid population
aging, the ratio will more than double by 2020 and will almost triple by
2050. These demographic trends have placed enormous pressure on the
ﬁnancial viability of the social security systems in these countries.
This pressure is compounded by another trend: In virtually every coun-
try, employees are leaving the labor force at younger and younger ages.
The labor force participation rates of men aged sixty to sixty-four for the
years 1960 to 1996 are shown for each of the ten countries in ﬁgure 2.2.
The decline was substantial in each country, but was much greater in some
countries than in others. In the early 1960s, the participation rates were
higher than 70 percent in all but one of the countries and higher than 80
percent in several countries. By the mid-1990s, the rate had fallen to less
than 20 percent in Belgium, Italy, France, and the Netherlands. It had
fallen to about 35 percent in Germany and 40 percent in Spain. Although
U.S. analysts have often emphasized the “dramatic” fall in the United
States, the U.S. decline from 82 percent to 53 percent was modest in com-
parison to the much more precipitous declines in these European coun-
tries. The decline to 57 percent in Sweden was also large, but modest when
compared to the fall in other countries. Japan stands out with the smallest
1. These projected trends account for projected birth rates, which are slowing in many
countries, and in future years will reduce the number of persons in the labor force.
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force participation rates of forty-ﬁve- to ﬁfty-nine-year-old men, as well as
those of men aged sixty and older, have also declined substantially. Below,
we will emphasize that these declines in labor force participation can be
attributed in large part to the provisions of the social security systems
themselves.
In many countries, the aging population and early retirement trends
come on top of very generous retirement beneﬁts, further compounding
the ﬁnancial consequences of these trends. For example, in Belgium,
France, Italy, and the Netherlands, the social security replacement rates—
the beneﬁt relative to ﬁnal earnings—at the early retirement age average
77, 91, 75, and 91 percent, respectively. In contrast, the replacement rate
at the early retirement age in Canada is only about 20 percent; in the
United States it is about 41 percent.
2.1.2 Incentive Eﬀects of Plan Provisions and Early Retirement
A critical feature of many social security systems is the incentive they
provide for early retirement. As emphasized above, the ﬁnancial pressure
of aging populations on social security systems is compounded by younger
and younger withdrawal from the labor force. Ironically, in many countries
social security provisions themselves provide enormous incentive to leave
the labor force early, thus by their very structure exacerbating the ﬁnancial
problems they face. Reducing the work penalty alone could improve the
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Fig. 2.1 Ratio of individuals in the population aged sixty-ﬁve and up to those aged
twenty to sixty-fourFig. 2.2 Labor-force participation trends for men aged sixty to sixty-four. Panel
A: Japan, Sweden, United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Belgium; Panel
B: Japan, Spain, the Netherlands, France, and Italy
Source: Gruber and Wise (1999b).
A
Bﬁnancial situation of social security systems in many countries, and we
return to this issue in discussion of reform possibilities.
Consider two components of total compensation for working an addi-
tional year. One component is current wage earnings. The other compo-
nent is the increase in future promised social security beneﬁts. Consider a
person who has attained the social security early retirement age (the age at
which beneﬁts are ﬁrst available), and suppose that person is considering
whether to work for an additional year. It is natural to suppose that if
beneﬁt receipt is delayed by a year, beneﬁts when they are received might
be increased, to oﬀset the receipt of beneﬁts for one year fewer. In most
countries, however, this is not the case. Once beneﬁts are available, a per-
son who continues work for an additional year will receive less in social
security beneﬁts over his or her lifetime than if the person quit work and
began to receive beneﬁts at the ﬁrst opportunity. That is, the present value
of expected social security beneﬁts declines. In many countries, this loss
of social security beneﬁts can oﬀset a large fraction of the wage earnings
a person would receive from continued work. Thus there is an implicit tax
on work, and total compensation can be much less than net wage earnings.
Data for Germany—summarized in Gruber and Wise (1998, 1999a) and
presented in more detail in Bo ¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999)—illustrate
the importance of this “implicit tax on work.” These data also illustrate
two other important features of social security systems: One is the impor-
tance of the age of ﬁrst eligibility for beneﬁts; the second is that, in many
countries, disability and unemployment insurance programs eﬀectively
provide early retirement before the explicit social security early retirement
age. In considering social security reform, therefore, these programs must
be considered in conjunction with the social security program itself.
Before 1972, the social security retirement age in Germany was sixty-
ﬁve, except in the case of disability, and there was no social security early
retirement age. However, legislation in 1972 provided for early retirement
at age sixty for women and at age sixty-three for men (given the accumula-
tion of required social security work years). In addition, liberal use of dis-
ability and unemployment beneﬁts eﬀectively expanded the early retire-
ment option. In a large fraction of cases, social security early retirement
beneﬁts were made available with no reduction in beneﬁts; beneﬁts taken
at the early retirement age were the same as those taken at the normal
retirement age. This greatly increased the net tax on work because de-
laying retirement simply reduced the number of years that one could re-
ceive beneﬁts, without increasing the annual beneﬁt.
In fact, there was a dramatic response to this increase in retirement
incentives. Over the next few years the mean retirement age of white-collar
workers was reduced by ﬁve and one-half years, as shown in ﬁgure 2.3.2
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2. The mean retirement age is the average age of persons retiring in a given year.The correspondence between plan provisions and retirement can also
be demonstrated by considering the relationship between retirement and
social security provisions at a point in time. The detailed provisions of the
1972 legislation are mirrored in the retirement rates by age. Figure 2.4
shows the proportion of men employed at a given age who retire at that
age—the hazard (or departure) rate. The ages of key plan provisions are
also noted in the ﬁgure so that the correspondence between provisions and
retirement is easily seen. Men who are disabled or unemployed at age sixty,
and who have a certain number of years of employment under the social
security system, are eligible for early retirement at that age. There is a large
corresponding jump in the retirement rate at that age. Men who have been
employed for thirty-ﬁve years are eligible for early retirement at age sixty-
three and there is a corresponding jump in the retirement rate at that age.
The normal retirement age is sixty-ﬁve and there is a corresponding spike
at that age as well. By age sixty-ﬁve, however, fewer than 29 percent of men
are still in the labor force. In addition, even before age sixty, liberal inter-
pretation of disability and unemployment plan provisions eﬀectively serves
to provide early retirement beneﬁts, a situation discussed in more depth
later.
Retirement eligibility may not by itself induce retirement, however. In
Germany, a high price is paid for not retiring if eligible. Consider, for ex-
ample, the prospects faced by a man with median earnings whose wife
is three years younger than he is. He—like 40 percent of older German
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Fig. 2.3 Mean retirement age in Germany
Source: Gruber and Wise (1999b).workers—would be eligible for disability beneﬁts were he to leave the labor
force. Suppose he could retire at age sixty but was considering postponing
retirement until age sixty-ﬁve. The receipt of beneﬁts for ﬁve fewer years
would not be oﬀset by larger beneﬁts. Indeed, the present value of beneﬁts
if taken at sixty-ﬁve would be much less than the present value of beneﬁts
if taken at sixty; that is, the social security accrual rate is negative. If retire-
ment were postponed by ﬁve years, the present value of the beneﬁts would
fall by almost 18 percent. Delaying retirement from sixty to sixty-one
would reduce the present value of future social security beneﬁts by more
than 4 percent. This large negative accrual rate implies a substantial tax
on additional work. The 4 percent reduction in beneﬁts from delaying re-
tirement until age sixty-one is equivalent to a tax of roughly 35 percent of
the net wage earnings from working an additional year. This represents an
enormous disincentive to continued work, in addition to the already high
earnings tax.
The tax rates on earnings for each additional year in the labor force
from age ﬁfty-ﬁve to age seventy are shown in ﬁgure 2.5. It is clear that
the cost of postponing retirement is substantial; a large fraction of what
would be gained in wage earnings if the person worked between sixty and
sixty-ﬁve, for example, is lost by way of reduced pension beneﬁts. Thus a
large fraction of employees retire as soon as they are eligible.
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Fig. 2.4 Hazard and labor force participation rates for Germany
Source: Gruber and Wise (1999b).The net eﬀect on labor force participation is illustrated by ﬁgure 2.6,
which describes the labor force status of men by age.3 Retirement under
the social security plan begins at age sixty and labor force participation
declines rapidly thereafter; by age sixty-ﬁve virtually all men are retired
under the social security retirement system.
This ﬁgure also provides an illustration of the interaction of the social
security system and other programs. The labor force participation of men
begins to fall well before the social security early retirement age. Indeed,
at age ﬁfty-nine—just before the social security early retirement age—
only about 50 percent of male employees are still in the labor force. The
fall coincides with the increase in the proportion of men who are receiving
unemployment beneﬁts and the proportion receiving disability beneﬁts.
These programs, in eﬀect, provide retirement beneﬁts before the social
security early retirement age. At age sixty, most of those who had been
receiving unemployment, and many of those receiving disability beneﬁts,
switch to receiving social security beneﬁts instead. At age sixty-ﬁve, all of
those who had been receiving disability beneﬁts switch to social security.
Gruber and Wise (1999a,b) show that there is a striking correspondence
between the implicit tax on work and the proportion of older persons who
Fig. 2.5 Tax rates on work in Germany
Source: Gruber and Wise (1999b).
3. Note that the labor force participation ﬁgures here do not correspond exactly to the
hazard rates shown earlier. The labor force status estimates are based on a nationally repre-
sentative microdata survey, whereas the hazard rate estimates are from administrative data
on pension receipts.have left the labor force. Figure 2.7 shows the relationship between the
(logarithm of the) “tax force” to retire (the summation of annual implicit
tax on work from the early retirement age to age sixty-nine) and “unused
capacity” (the proportion of men aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-ﬁve who are out
of the labor force) in several countries. The correspondence between these
two measures is striking: The variation in the tax force across countries
can explain more than 80 percent of the variation in unused capacity. Al-
though there may be other factors correlated with the tax force that are
also driving work decisions at older ages, this enormous correspondence,
taken together with case studies for Germany and other countries in
Gruber and Wise (1999b), suggests strongly that social security incentives
are an important determinant of work decisions.
2.1.3 Saving, Return, and Risk Features of the PAYGO System
A simple representation of the relationship between tax receipts and
beneﬁts in the PAYGO system will help emphasize the importance of the
population and labor force trends and will also highlight other features of
the PAYGO system. The relationship can be represented by
(Number in the Labor Force)  (Average Wage)  (Tax Rate)
 (Number of Retirees)  (Beneﬁt per Retiree).
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Fig. 2.6 Status of men by age in Germany
Source: Gruber and Wise (1999b).The left side represents tax receipts and the right side represents beneﬁts
paid. An aging population increases the number of retirees. Early depar-
ture from the labor force further increases the number of retirees and re-
duces the number of persons in the labor force. If receipts are to equal
beneﬁts, the tax rate is given by
Tax Rate 
Number of Retirees
Number in the Labor Force 
Benefit
Wage Rate
 (Dependency Ratio)  (Replacement Rate).
Thus, the larger the replacement rate, the greater the increase in the tax
rate required to balance tax receipts and beneﬁts paid when the depen-
dency ratio increases. Both population aging (together with increasing life
expectancy) and a declining retirement age increase the dependency ratio.
With rapidly increasing dependency ratios, the prospect is for large in-
creases in social security tax rates, unless beneﬁts are changed. To put it
another way, balancing the system requires that beneﬁts be given by
(Beneﬁt per Retiree) 

Number in the Labor Force
Number Retired   (Wage Rate)  (Tax Rate).
Thus, without changes in the tax rate, more retirees relative to persons in
the labor force will mean lower beneﬁts.
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Fig. 2.7 Unused capacity versus tax force
Source: Gruber and Wise (1999b).These relationships make clear additional features of PAYGO systems
that are important in considering possible reforms. First, there is no na-
tional saving inherent in the PAYGO system, although current workers
may think of promised future beneﬁts as though they were personal saving.
Unlike with private saving, no money is set aside today that can be in-
vested and used to support consumption after retirement.
A second feature of PAYGO systems useful in evaluating potential re-
forms is the rate of return on contributions to (“investment” in) the social
security system. The implicit rate of return is the rate of growth of the tax
base, that is, the rate of growth of gross domestic product (GDP), which in
turn is the product of the growth in thelabor force times the real increase in
the wage rate. To see this, note that current workers contribute an amount
given by the left side of the ﬁrst equality above, and current retirees receive
that amount. However, when current workers are retired, they will receive
beneﬁts determined by the tax on future labor earnings. In a mature sys-
tem, each generation of workers gives up a fraction of its earnings in ex-
change for the same fraction of earnings (hopefully larger) from the next
generation. (In the United States, or example, the Social Security Adminis-
tration now assumes a long-run GDP growth rate of 1.1 percent.) With a
rapidly aging population, however, individual realized rates of return may
diﬀer substantially from this norm. Indeed, the future tax base may not
be large enough to provide the same level of (future) beneﬁts to current
workers that today’s workers are providing for current retirees.
Third, like other ways of saving for retirement, personal risk is associ-
ated with investment in the social security system. Beneﬁts promised now
may not in fact be available in the future. Demographic trends such as
those emphasized above may be unanticipated, or may be inadequately
accounted for in funding projections, and thus stipulated beneﬁts may be
incompatible with future population trends. Even in the absence of demo-
graphic changes, the vagaries of the political process can change beneﬁts.
Changes two or three decades ago typically increased beneﬁts; more recent
changes have typically reduced beneﬁts. McHale (2000) shows that recent
reform proposals in many Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries will substantially reduce the beneﬁts of
future retirees in those countries. As explained in Wise (2000), true risk is
likely to be greater than McHale’s calculations demonstrate.
2.2 Reform
There is growing realization around the world that to avoid ﬁnancial
crisis, social security systems must be changed. How to change the sys-
tems, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in many coun-
tries. Here we consider diﬀerent ways that the systems might be reformed,
commenting on the economic implications of each. The goals of reform
depend in part on the current circumstances in each country and in part
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weight they place on speciﬁc goals. The following are a few prominent
economic goals:
1. To correct the ﬁnancial imbalance faced by social security systems.
This is a goal shared by all reform proposals.
2. To increase national saving.
3. To increase the economic eﬃciency of the systems. Perhaps the most
important ineﬃciency in current systems is the implicit penalty on work
inherent in plan provisions.
4. To redistribute income, or to maintain income redistribution. This is
an important goal in some countries but is much less important in others.
Redistribution is a prominent feature of the U.S. system,4 for example, but
not of the German system.
The central economic goal might be put this way: It seems inevitable that
the young will have to consume less than they otherwise would to save for
their own retirement while at the same time paying the beneﬁts of current
retirees. What is the least painful way—the way that requires the least
reduction in consumption—to accomplish this goal? With this general fo-
cus in mind, we consider three categories of reform: (1) removing the work
penalty, (2) incremental reform, and (3) fundamental reform.
Removing the provisions that encourage early retirement could be con-
sidered either a speciﬁc reform or an important aspect of other reforms.
We treat it separately. Incremental proposals, under our categorization, do
not change the basic structure of the PAYGO system, but address the ﬁ-
nancial imbalance of the system by some combination of increased taxes
and reduced beneﬁts. Fundamental reform includes various proposals that
would change the basic structure of the social security system. Proposals
of this type typically involve at least some prefunding of the system, usu-
ally through the creation of personal accounts or through government pur-
chase of ﬁnancial assets on the part of the social security system.
2.2.1 Removing the Work Penalty
The early retirement incentives discussed above are implicit in the plan
provisions that determine beneﬁts. The key question is whether the in-
crease in beneﬁts if retirement is delayed is large enough to oﬀset the loss
in foregone beneﬁts when their receipt is postponed. Reducing the penalty
on continued work at older ages could substantially improve the long-run
ﬁscal balance of social security systems in many countries. This aspect of
social security provisions can be important under all reform proposals that
maintain a deﬁned beneﬁt component. These incentive eﬀects are largely
4. Liebman (2002), however, shows that features such as spousal beneﬁts and diﬀerential
mortality oﬀset some of the redistribution implicit in the basic formula and lead to a wide
range of rates of return for persons at any given level of lifetime earnings.
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tem, but may still be present to some extent if beneﬁts are in the form of
forced annuitization.5
The most important determinant of the tax on work is the early retire-
ment reduction factor—the reduction in beneﬁts if they are taken before
the normal retirement age. At one extreme are systems, such as Germany’s,
in which early retirement (or disability or unemployment) beneﬁts at age
sixty are essentially the same as normal retirement beneﬁts at sixty-ﬁve.6
For those who are eligible for beneﬁts at age sixty, there is a strong incen-
tive to retire at sixty. A person who works for an additional year will re-
ceive no increase in subsequent beneﬁts to oﬀset the receipt of beneﬁts for
one year fewer. Because there is no early retirement reduction, there is also
no increase in beneﬁts if their receipt is delayed beyond the early retire-
ment age. Thus the present discounted value of future social security bene-
ﬁts declines.
On the other hand, consider a system such as that in the United States:
Beneﬁts at the early retirement age of sixty-two are only 80 percent of
beneﬁts at the normal retirement age of sixty-ﬁve. In fact, the early retire-
ment reduction is “actuarially fair”; that is, the present discounted value
of beneﬁts begun at the early retirement age is roughly equal to the present
discounted value of beneﬁts begun at the normal retirement age, or at any
age in between. There is no incentive to retire early.
If one moved from a system like that in Germany to one with an actuari-
ally fair early retirement reduction, the ﬁscal imbalance in the social secu-
rity system would be improved in two ways: First, beneﬁts for persons who
continued to take them before the normal retirement age would be lower.
Second, to the extent that persons would work longer—and the Gruber
and Wise (1999b) analysis shows that they certainly would in many coun-
tries—social security tax receipts would be increased. Or, in terms of the
equalities above, the dependency ratio is reduced, social security beneﬁts
are reduced, and social security tax receipts are increased. Moreover, by
removing the large work penalty, actuarial reduction in early retirement
beneﬁts would yield clear gains in economic eﬃciency.
Many variants might remove the work penalty but do little to improve
the ﬁnancial imbalance of social security systems. For example, early re-
tirement beneﬁts could be maintained and normal retirement beneﬁts in-
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5. The reason that even a deﬁned contribution system may have some work disincentives
is that there may be forced annuitization of beneﬁt payouts at some common rate. Forced
annuitization would imply that the short-lived face lower return on their contributions, and
the long-lived a higher rate of return, relative to a system without forced annuitization. This
could in turn imply that social security is imposing a tax or a subsidy on work at all ages,
including those ages near retirement, providing a small disincentive or incentive to addi-
tional work.
6. The German illustrations used in this paper are based on legislation under which most
recent retirees left the labor force. Recent legislative changes have changed some provisions,
including the early retirement reduction.creased; or, early beneﬁts could be reduced somewhat and normal beneﬁts
increased somewhat. Such reforms would have uncertain ﬁnancial impli-
cations. On the one hand, individuals would work longer, as the evidence
in Gruber and Wise (1999b) shows. On the other hand, beneﬁts would be
increased for some groups and perhaps lowered for others.
Similar incentives pertain to work beyond the normal retirement age. In
this case as well, beneﬁts often are not increased enough to oﬀset their
receipt for fewer years when retirement is delayed. That is, the beneﬁt in-
crease is not actuarially fair. This is currently the case in the United States,
for example (although this deﬁciency will be addressed by delayed retire-
ment increases that will be phased in by 2008). In this case there are two
eﬀects on the social security balance sheet: If beneﬁts are increased when
retirement is delayed, the increase in labor supply will reduce the depen-
dency ratio, thus reducing the system ﬁnancial imbalance. Beneﬁts for
those who delay, however, retirement will be higher. The net ﬁscal implica-
tions for the social security system depend on whether the additional work
raises the receipt of social security taxes enough to oﬀset the increase in
beneﬁts for those who work longer. However, just like the eﬀe c to fr e m o v -
ing the penalty on work after the early retirement age, economic eﬃciency
is improved by removing the implicit tax on work beyond the normal re-
tirement age. Older workers are free to choose the retirement age most
beneﬁcial to them.7
2.2.2 Incremental Reform
As emphasized above, actuarial reduction of early retirement beneﬁts
would eliminate the work penalty and reduce the ﬁnancial liability of the
socialsecuritysystemsinmanycountries,withoutchangingtheearlyornor-
mal retirement ages. Suppose that the early retirement beneﬁt reduction
(as well as the delayed retirement beneﬁt increase) are actuarially fair. In-
cremental reforms can reduce the system liability: Beneﬁts can be reduced
or tax receipts can be increased. We ﬁrst consider reduction in beneﬁts.
Reducing Beneﬁts
Social security systems can be brought into ﬁnancial balance by re-
ducing beneﬁts. In principle, all beneﬁts could simply be cut by a given
amount. In practice, however, most reform proposals are much less inci-
sive, for several reasons: to reduce the transparency of reductions, perhaps
increasing the political feasibility of reform; to use the reform to change
7. It is perhaps worth noting that a smaller step to reducing the work penalty is to allow
recomputation of beneﬁts to reﬂect possible higher earnings past the early retirement age.
This is a feature of the U.S. system, for example, but not of most European systems. Earning
at later ages is typically higher than at younger ages. In the United States, beneﬁts are based
on the thirty-ﬁve highest earning-years, so that additional work may mean higher average
earning and thus higher beneﬁts. Adding such a feature would also increase the return to
work, and thereby increase work at older ages and reduce the dependency ratio.
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those most reliant on beneﬁts are shielded from cuts.
Increase the Normal Retirement Age. Perhaps the most commonly pro-
posed way to reduce beneﬁts is to increase the normal retirement age. For
example, the normal retirement age might be raised from sixty-ﬁve to
sixty-seven (which is one of the currently planned revisions in the U.S.
social security system, for example). In this case, beneﬁts now available at
age sixty-ﬁve would not be available until sixty-seven. Assuming that early
retirement beneﬁts are reduced actuarially, beneﬁts at any age would be
lower than they were. Thus, the increase in the normal retirement age is
equivalenttoareductioninbeneﬁtswiththenormalretirement age left un-
changed. In addition, the reduction in beneﬁts is likely to induce later
retirement: To maintain a given standard of living after retirement, a per-
son would have to work longer. In this case, the dependency ratio would
be reduced and tax receipts would be increased, assuming actuarial reduc-
tion in beneﬁts.8
Increase the Early Retirement Age. It is clear from Gruber and Wise
(1999a,b) that an increase in the early retirement age would delay the re-
tirement of most individuals who now leave the labor force at the early
retirement age. An increase in the early retirement age, from (for example)
sixty to sixty-two, would delay receipt of beneﬁts, but the present value of
beneﬁts would not change—assuming actuarial reduction in early retire-
ment beneﬁts. Because labor force participation would be prolonged, how-
ever, social security tax receipts would be increased.
If there were no early retirement beneﬁt reduction, or the reduction were
less than actuarially fair, an increase in the early retirement age would
necessarily reduce total beneﬁts. In Germany, for example, persons could
receive the same annual beneﬁt, but could not begin to receive beneﬁts
until age sixty-two rather than sixty.
Reduce Indexation of Beneﬁts. Beneﬁts are typically based on past wages,
although not necessarily on lifetime wages. In most cases, past wages are
used to determine beneﬁts at the normal retirement age. Beneﬁts taken at
earlier ages are based on the beneﬁts at the normal retirement age. In most
countries beneﬁts are indexed to accommodate increases in the cost of
living; in the United States, for example, beneﬁts are indexed to a con-
sumer price index (CPI). Another way to reduce beneﬁts is to reduce the
8. The increase in the normal retirement age in the United States, for example, will be
accompanied by reduced actuarial adjustments from age sixty-two to sixty-four, put in place
to minimize the beneﬁt cut on those aged sixty-two and sixty-three. As a result, Coile and
Gruber (2000) ﬁnd only small net impacts on retirement from such a move, because the
reductions in actuarial adjustment reduce the incentive for additional work at the same time
that the reduction in beneﬁts increases that incentive.
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CPI increases, less 1 percentage point.
Increase Earning Years. Beneﬁts might also be reduced by changing the
formula used to calculate normal retirement beneﬁts. How this might be
done depends on the beneﬁt formula. In Italy (before 1993), for example,
beneﬁts are based on the ﬁve years of earnings just before retirement. In
the United States the highest thirty-ﬁve years of earnings are used to ob-
tain average lifetime earnings, which are used to determine normal retire-
ment beneﬁts. Beneﬁts can be reduced by increasing the number of years
used in this formula. Because the top thirty-ﬁve years are used now, earn-
ings in any additional years must necessarily be no greater than the lowest
of the currently used thirty-ﬁve years. Thus average earnings can be no
higher, and would typically be lower, than the current average.
Reduce Indexation of Earnings. Beneﬁts can also be reduced by changing
the way that earnings are indexed. In the United States, for example, aver-
age indexed monthly earnings are determined by indexing earnings to age
sixty-two based on a nominal wage index. The wage index is essentially
the sum of productivity gains and price increases, so indexation based on
a price index would yield lower average indexed monthly earnings, and
thus lower normal retirement beneﬁts.
Increase the Tax on Beneﬁts. Beneﬁts can be reduced by taxing them more
heavily. In the United States, for example, the tax on Social Security bene-
ﬁts depends on total income—families with incomes above a given level
pay taxes on Social Security beneﬁts. The income level at which Social
Security beneﬁts are taxed could be lowered.
Increasing Tax Receipts
Increasing the social security tax rate is a straightforward way to in-
crease receipts. Another way to increase receipts is less direct. Taxes are
typically based on wage earnings; but in some countries, such as the United
States, earnings are taxed only up to the covered earnings limit. In the
UnitedStates,thislimithasincreasedsubstantiallyovertimeandcontinues
to increase. If all earnings were taxed, for example, receipts would be in-
creased.9
Equivalent to an increase in the social security tax rate is the use of other
taxes to pay social security beneﬁts. Forexample, in the United States there
has been considerable discussion of using the budget surplus (which today
9. Although the ﬁnancial implications for the social security system do not depend on the
source of the revenue, the choice of tax used may have diﬀerent eﬃciency implications for
the economy as a whole. For example, raising the earning limit in the United States could
lose revenue for the tax system as a whole.
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but may be greater in the future) to add to the Social Security trust fund.
Using other tax receipts to pay social security beneﬁts is of course a substi-
tuteforincreasingthesocialsecuritytaxrate.(Althoughthetwoapproaches
are dollar substitutes, they may be very diﬀe r e n tw i t hr e s p e c tt ow h op a y s
the taxes.) Incremental reform proposals may include a combination of
several of these methods of increasing taxes and reducing beneﬁts.
2.2.3 Fundamental Reform
In principle, there are at least two ways to change the current PAYGO
system fundamentally: prefunding or introducing individual accounts (or
both; see table 2.1). The current PAYGO system incorporates neither
change. In principle, the social security system could be taken oﬀ-budget
and treated much like an employer-provided pension fund. Like private
pensions funds, a social security fund could be funded in accordance with
future expected beneﬁt payments. Beneﬁts could continue to be paid on a
deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) basis, much as they are now—this would be a funded
DB system. Similarly, as an accounting matter, individual accounts could
be established without prefunding. The “amount” in an individual’s ac-
count could be based entirely on social security taxes paid by or on behalf
of that person; such accounts are sometimes called notional individual ac-
counts. The most common fundamental reform proposals, however, involve
both individual accounts and prefunding. Some approaches would convert
the entire system to one of individual accounts and in so doing prefund
the entire system. Other proposals would convert part of the system to one
based on personal prefunded accounts, leaving some portion to operate as
a PAYGO, DB system.
There are two related economic motivations for prefunding social secu-
rity. One is that the expected rate of return on these accounts would pre-
sumably be much larger than the implicit rate of return on contributions
to a PAYGO system. For example, the average real rate of return on equi-
ties in the United States since 1926 has been about 9 percent. The average
real rate of return on a portfolio of 40 percent bonds and 60 percent equi-
ties has been about 5.5 percent. (The U.S. Social Security Administration
Table 2.1 Reform Possibilities
Prefunding
Individual Accounts No Yes
No Current pay-as-you-go Funded deﬁned-beneﬁt system
system (increased trust fund balance)
Yes Notional individual Individual accounts with deﬁned-
accounts contribution component
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that in the long run the system could be funded—and the same beneﬁts
provided—with a lower tax rate, if personal accounts were invested in
private ﬁnancial markets. To put it another way, many countries face the
prospect of large tax rate increases to fund current PAYGO systems; the
required tax increases would be much smaller if the increased tax revenues
were invested in the market.
The second purpose suggested for personal accounts is to increase per-
sonal saving. As emphasized above, it seems evident that the young in
virtually all countries will have to save more. A strictly PAYGO system
involves no saving, unlike (for example) private employer-provided or indi-
vidual retirement saving plans, which are funded by saving today to pay
for future retirement beneﬁts. Below we emphasize that at the outset of
the transition to such a system, the increased saving (by the young) is used
to pay for their own retirement while at the same time paying for those
who are retired or will retire under the PAYGO system.10
Prefunding the Entire System: Illustrative Calculations
When considering prefunding of the social security system, the transi-
tion from a PAYGO to a funded system is a critical issue and has been the
subject of substantial analysis. We begin ﬁrst with a simple example that
illustrates the potential gain after the transition, with a fully mature pre-
funded system in place. To get a picture of the eventual gain from a pre-
funded system with personal retirement accounts (or a system that is par-
tially prefunded, with a deﬁned contribution [DC] component), consider
this simple example: Assume that individuals work from age twenty-ﬁve
to sixty-ﬁve and live in retirement from age sixty-ﬁve to eighty-ﬁve. Sup-
pose, to simplify further, that persons contribute to social security at age
forty-ﬁve and receive beneﬁts at seventy-ﬁve. If the gross domestic product
(GDP) growth rate is 1.1 percent, $1.00 invested at age forty-ﬁve would
grow to (1.01)30  $1.39 by age seventy-ﬁve. On the other hand, at a cer-
tain 9 percent rate of return, $1.00 invested in equities would grow to
(1.09)30  $13.28 by age seventy-ﬁve. Using these values, $1.00 invested in
equities yields 9.56 times as much as the PAYGO system would. Thus, to
fund the system with equity investment (assuming this rate of return)
would require only one-tenth as much as the PAYGO tax rate. Similar
calculations show that to fund the system using a mixed stock-bond port-
folio returning (for example) 6 percent would require less than one-fourth
of the PAYGO tax rate. Of course, the market rate of return is uncertain;
analysis of the potential risk from this uncertainty is discussed below.
In the transition from the current PAYGO system to a prefunded sys-
10. Feldstein and Samwick (2000) have proposed that under certain assumptions the tran-
sition could take place in the United States without an increase in the Social Security tax rate.
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their own personal accounts. To illustrate the transition to a prefunded
system, Feldstein and Samwick (1996b, 1997) simulate a gradual phase-in
of a funded system in the United States. Their illustrative personal account
system provides the same aggregate beneﬁts as the current system. They
assume that persons begin to work at age thirty. The cohort that reaches
age thirty in 1995 participates in the PAYGO system and begins to partici-
pate in the personal account system. Over the next twenty-ﬁve years, each
cohort that reaches age twenty-ﬁve participates in both, but later cohorts
participate only in the personal account component; they cease to accrue
PAYGO beneﬁts. They begin with a personal-account tax of 2.00 percent.
As successive cohorts retire, increasingly larger fractions of beneﬁts are
provided by the personal component. The beneﬁts that the personal-
account balances provide replace some of the PAYGO beneﬁts. This in
turn permits a smaller PAYGO tax the next year, and so forth.
The stream of combined personal account and PAYGO taxes that would
be required between 1995 and 2070 is shown in ﬁgure 2.8, along with the
taxes that would be required to provide beneﬁts under the current PAYGO
system. During the transition period, the combined tax rate declines from
14.40 percent to 2.02 percent. Feldstein and Samwick assume that the
current PAYGO tax rate would remain at the present 12.4 percent until
the Social Security trust fund is exhausted; thereafter the rate increases to
18.25 percent by 2070, as projected by the Social Security Administration.
The ﬁgure shows that between 1995 and about 2015, employees will pay
more than the current tax rate. This area might be thought of as the cost
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Fig. 2.8 PAYGO versus combined tax rate (by transition year)
Source: Feldstein and Samwick (1996a).of the transition to a prefunded system. Thereafter, the tax rate is lower;
this area might be thought of as the beneﬁt of the transition. (Whether the
beneﬁts outweigh the costs, of course, depends in part on the extent to
which one discounts the beneﬁts to future generations compared to the
costs of current generations.) Additional discussion of prefunding is pre-
sented in Feldstein (1997).
Similar simulations describing the transition to a personal account pre-
funded system have been made for Germany by Bo ¨rsch-Supan (1998). The
German system is much more generous than the U.S. program and the
social security beneﬁts provide more than 80 percent of the preretirement
income of retirees. The German population is also aging much more rap-
idly than the U.S. population. As a result, the unfunded liability of the
German system is much greater than that of the U.S. system.
Figure 2.9 shows a transition scenario for German similar to the one
above for the United States, but in this case, instead of the tax rate, average
individual contributions are compared. The transition begins in the year
2005, when persons who retire (at age sixty, by assumption) will get a
PAYGO beneﬁt proportional to the share of their work lives that passed
before 2005. The work life is assumed to be forty years; thus, for a person
retiring in 2006, 39/40 of the retirement beneﬁt will come from the PAYGO
system and 1/40 from the personal account component. A person retiring
in 2007 will obtain 38/40 from the PAYGO system and 2/40 from the per-
sonal account. From the year 2045 onward no worker will acquire new
PAYGO pension rights. The simulated time path of contributions under
these assumptions is shown in ﬁgure 2.9. A comparison of ﬁgures 2.8 and
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Fig. 2.9 Germany: Contributions (PAYGO versus transition to PRA)
Source: Bo ¨rsch-Supan (1998).11. The proposal also includes other provisions to reduce beneﬁts and to increase taxes.
For example, the normal retirement age would be increased, and the early retirement age
would also be increased gradually from sixty-two to sixty-ﬁve.
2.9 shows that the pattern of required contributions (or tax rates) is very
similar, reﬂecting the similar assumptions made in the two analyses. In the
United States the ultimate personal account tax rate is about 2 percent
compared to the projected PAYGO tax rate of 18.25 percent, a ratio of
0.11. In Germany, the ultimate personal contribution is 163 Deutsche
marks under the personal retirement account (PRA) versus 1,368
Deutsche marks under the personal account system, a ratio of 0.12.
Wetakethesecalculations fortheUnitedStatesandGermany tobeillus-
trative. Diﬀerent assumptions would lead to diﬀerent quantitative results.
AslongasthereturninthemarketsubstantiallyexceedsthePAYGOrateof
return, however, the qualitative results would not change. In addition to
lower future costs to provide the same beneﬁts, the more transparent rela-
tionship between personal account contributions and beneﬁts is likely to
dampen the labor supply reduction inherent in redistributive PAYGO sys-
tems. These illustrative calculations, however, do not address the impor-
tance of uncertain returns in the market; we return to that issue below.
Partial Prefunding and Personal Account Proposals
Several actual proposals combine a DC personal account component
with a PAYGO DB component, creating a two-tier system. The contribu-
tions to the DC component—Tier 2—could be invested in the market.
Some proposals begin by reducing the generosity of the PAYGO system
and adding a DC component to it; an alternative is to maintain the current
system as it is and add the DC component. We give one example of each,
drawn from proposals in the United States. Both are motivated by the
realization that future tax rate increases could be replaced by a smaller
increase if market-invested personal accounts were introduced.
Among the plans proposed by the Social Security Advisory Council
(1997) was a personal security account (PSA). This proposal sets a ﬂat
monthly beneﬁt funded by the PAYGO system (Tier 1): $410 for single
retirees and $615 for married couples for those with thirty-ﬁve years of
earnings. These ﬂat rates would be indexed to real wage earnings in the
future. To fund the PSA (Tier 2), 5 percent of earnings would be placed in
the PSA. The tax rate to support the Tier 1 beneﬁts would be set at 8.92
percent. (Thus, the PAYGO payroll tax rate is reduced from 12.4 to 8.92
percent, and a mandatory 5 percent contribution to the PSA is instituted.)
The proposal would be phased in, with gradual adoption of the PSA.11
Discussion of social security personal accounts typically refers both to
contributions to fund the personal account component, and to taxes to
fund the PAYGO component, as tax rates. There is a diﬀerence between
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of as forced saving, if it is mandatory, or personal saving, if it is not. On the
other hand, the PAYGO tax conforms more closely to a typical tax: It can
be used to support a broader social program than the personal account
component can.
Schieber and Shoven (1999) have suggested a variant of the PSA plan:
lowering the current payroll tax rate to 9.9 percent and introducing a man-
datory 5 percent contribution to an individual account. In addition, they
set the ﬂat Tier 1 beneﬁt somewhat higher—$450 instead of $410. Feld-
stein and Samwick (1998a) have also proposed a two-tier system, which
takes advantage of the current budget surplus to adopt personal accounts.
In addition to the current PAYGO tax, individuals would contribute 2 per-
cent of earnings—up to the U.S. Social Security limit—to a personal ac-
count. When beneﬁts are taken, part of the gains from the personal ac-
count are oﬀset by a reduction in the Tier 1 (current system) beneﬁts. Their
proposal is to guarantee beneﬁts at least equal to those under the current
system. The contribution is treated as a cashable income tax credit: if the
contribution is greater than the tax bill, the excess is re c e i v e da sat a x
refund from the Internal Revenue Service. The contributions are invested
in the private market. The beneﬁts from the personal account would be in
the form of an indexed life annuity, such as the current U.S. Social Security
beneﬁts. However, for every dollar of Tier 2 beneﬁts, Tier 1 beneﬁts would
be reduced by 75 cents. Thus the concept is that no one would receive
lower beneﬁts under this two-tier system than they do at present, and the
government would capture much of the gain from market investment of
personal accounts to support the current PAYGO system.
2.2.4 Summary of Economic Implications
We consider ﬁrst the proposals discussed above. Then we comment on
the possibility of investing PAYGO-system contributions in the market.
Proposals Discussed Above
An important feature (and perhaps the most important economic in-
eﬃciency) of most current PAYGO, DB social security systems is the work
penalty. (As mentioned below, high social security tax rates have more-
general labor supply reduction eﬀects, an ineﬃciency made greater by the
departure of older persons from the labor force, which increases the social
security taxes on those still working.) The implicit tax on work can be
eliminated by changing the beneﬁt formula under the current DB struc-
ture. The most important change would be the introduction of an actuari-
ally fair, early retirement beneﬁt reduction. This ineﬃciency is largely re-
moved under a DC (personal account) system. Indeed, even an unfunded
notional account system would largely eliminate this ineﬃciency.
Removing the implicit tax on work reduces the future burden on the
young; it reduces the future reduction in consumption that they will have
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in the labor force increases national output as well as national saving. In-
ducing older workers to leave the labor force—as current systems do—
increases the tax on the young (workers) and may in fact induce them to
work less, further reducing national output.
It is worth pausing to emphasize that economies are not boxed. Numer-
ous anecdotal comments suggest that provisions to induce older workers
to retire were introduced to make room for younger workers to enter the
labor force. We have not, however, attempted to determine whether there
is convincing evidence that this was in fact the motivation for current pro-
visions. Regardless of whether the claim is true, reducing economic output
by reducing the labor supply of older workers can only make the ﬁnancial
problems of social security systems worse. Economies grow and can ab-
sorb increasingly larger numbers of workers. Reducing the labor supply of
older workers can only reduce economic output in the long run.
Incremental reforms—to reduce beneﬁts and increase social security
taxes—canalleviatetheﬁnancialimbalanceofthePAYGOsystem,butwill
do little to increase national saving. In addition, incremental reforms may
be only a temporary ﬁx, with the systems as open to future ﬁnancial crises
as the current ones are. On the other hand, redistribution is an important
feature of some social security systems. A key feature of the U.S. system,
for example, is that relatively higher beneﬁts are given to persons with low
lifetime earnings. Incremental reform maintains this redistribution.
Fundamental reform proposals, with a DB personal account compo-
nent, would likely increase personal saving. Poterba, Venti, and Wise, in
fact, have written a series of papers on the saving eﬀects of 401(k) and
individual retirement account (IRA) plans in the United States and ﬁnd
that the vast majority of contributions represent net new saving. Although
some diﬀerence of opinion continues, we believe the weight of evidence
heavily supports their conclusion, which they summarize in Poterba, Venti,
and Wise (1998c). This evidence suggests that social security personal ac-
counts would likely not substitute much for personal saving either. (In-
deed, a large fraction of persons who would be covered by such accounts
in the United States have no personal saving to reduce.)
In addition, funds in personal accounts are less likely than funds in a
government trust fund to be oﬀset by increases elsewhere in the govern-
ment budget, and national saving would be increased as well. During the
transition period, the new saving funds the transition. In a mature system,
the PSA saving is used to provide individual retirement beneﬁts. In addi-
tion, investment in the equity market would yield greater expected asset
accumulation at retirement than the accumulation under the implicit re-
turn on current social security contributions. The expected cost of provid-
ing given beneﬁts would be smaller—thus, the expected future ﬁnancial
burden on the young would be reduced.
There are two principle concerns about such plans: One is that the redis-
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maintained. The other is that the risk associated with market investments
could reduce the beneﬁts of some participants, compared to current
PAYGO DB systems.
A good deal of conceptual and empirical work has been directed to
these interrelated issues in the United States. In most cases the empirical
evaluations and proposals consider the likelihood of maintaining beneﬁts
greater than those provided under the current system. Feldstein, Ran-
guelova, and Samwick (2001) show that for a typical person with average
earnings, a personal account system with a 6 percent contribution rate
would stand a very high chance of providing beneﬁts higher than those
provided by the currentU.S. system. They show that thiswould also be true
for the typical wage earner under a mixed system with a personal account
system (with a 2.3 percent saving rate) on top of the current system.
Perhaps more relevant are the calculations that Feldstein and Liebman
(2002) make for a representative sample of social security participants
with essentially the full range of family status and earnings histories. They
show that under a pure personal account system witha9p e r c e n tc o n t r i -
bution rate and historical rates of market return (5.5 percent), 94 percent
of participants would have higher beneﬁts than those provided by a 15.4
percent contribution rate to the current PAYGO system.12 Qualitatively
similar results are obtained under a politically more realistic system that
maintains the current PAYGO tax rate, combined with a supplemental 3
percent contribution rate to a personal account. Even so, the relative in-
crease of beneﬁts would be greater for those with the highest earnings, and
those with lower earnings would be more likely to receive lower beneﬁts.
Feldstein and Liebman then show that the Supplemental Security Income
program puts a lower ﬂoor on beneﬁts such that virtually no participants
would receive beneﬁts lower than those provided by the two programs
together, and that, through government “redistributive” contributions to
personal accounts, the mixed system can achieve the same level of progres-
siveness as the current system. They also show that under very low rates of
return, based on historical standards, very few participants would receive
beneﬁts much lower than those provided by the current system.
The two proposed programs discussed above also rely on a beneﬁt ﬂoor
to maintain beneﬁts at least as great as under the current system. Feldstein
and Samwick (1998c) do this by explicitly guaranteeing beneﬁts equal to
those under the current PAYGO system. The Schieber and Shoven (1999)
plan sets a ﬂoor on beneﬁts, to be funded by a PAYGO DB system, but
does not guarantee beneﬁts above the ﬂoor. Schieber and Shoven show,
however, that under historical rates of return a 5 percent contribution to
a personal account would be very unlikely to lead to lower beneﬁts than
12. This is the required tax rate projected by the Social Security Administration to fund
Old Age Survivors Insurance (OASI) beneﬁts for persons retiring in 2075.
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important to keep in mind that current PAYGO systems present substan-
tial individual risk as well.
The administrative cost of managing personal accounts could also be
an important constraint on realized market returns. There has been a good
deal of debate about this issue in the United States. Much of the available
evidence is presented in Shoven (2000). Our evaluation of this evidence
suggests that administrative costs are nontrivial, but would not be nearly
large enough to oﬀset the diﬀerence between market returns and the im-
plicit return on Social Security contributions in the United States.
Trust-Fund Market Investment
An alternative to individual accounts is to invest social security contri-
butions—under the DB system—in the market, much as is done with pri-
vate pension fund contributions. (For example, such a proposal was for
some time part of President Clinton’s plan for the United States.) The hope
is that the greater return from market investment of the trust fund would
allow the system to meet future obligations with smaller tax rate increases
than would otherwise be required.
In principle, such a plan could allow future liabilities to be met without
increasing the social security tax rate, or without forcing the young to
save more through personal accounts. In particular, it aims to avoid the
transition cost of prefunding. It also would minimize administrative costs,
which will presumably be considerably larger for a large number of small
personal accounts.
Such proposals also try to address the diﬃcult political trade-oﬀsb e -
tween individual control and government “protection.” Consider annuiti-
zation. One motivation for social security is that individuals, left to their
own ends, may not save enough for their old age, which also suggests pay-
ing beneﬁts in the form of an annuity rather than as a lump sum. For
perhaps similar reasons, personal account proposals also suggest annuiti-
zation of assets at retirement. This, of course, takes some control away
from the individual, limiting the extent to which these accounts are strictly
“personal.” Similarly, typical personal account proposals have in mind that
some limits would be placed on personal account investments. Investment
of the trust fund in equities avoids these tensions.
Compared to personal accounts, however, this approach also presents
important limitations. One is that it does nothing to increase national sav-
ing. Although such a scheme would likely increase the return on social
security contributions, it would increase national saving for retirement
only if resources that would otherwise be consumed are added to the trust
fund—and retained in the fund until they are paid out as beneﬁts. Other-
wise, simply investing existing trust fund assets in the market would only
induce asset swapping between the private sector and the social security
trust fund, and would achieve no incremental saving. Unlike personal ac-
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day’s workers to pay for future retirement beneﬁts. That is, by trying to
avoid the pain of increased saving—which might include the transition
cost to a funded system—it also forgoes the gain.
A second important limitation of such a system is political intrusion.
With investment of contributions in the market, the government could ulti-
mately control an important fraction of the private capital market, provid-
ing an opening for politically motivated investment decisions. Addition-
ally, with the accumulations kept in a trust fund rather than in personal
accounts, there is signiﬁcant risk that the trust fund would be “raided”
during periods of future government deﬁcit. That is, given the inherent
diﬃculty that politicians have with leaving surpluses untouched, investing
the trust fund could simply increase the amount of money they might be
tempted to spend. Funds in personal accounts are further removed from
the control of politicians and therefore less likely to be raided in times of
budget pressures. In theory, of course, independent institutions (such as
the Federal Reserve Board in the United States) might be established to
deal with such problems. In practice, however, the eﬀectiveness of this
insulation is questionable, particularly in countries without a strong his-
tory of independent central banks.
2.2.5 Other Retirement Support
In many countries the social security system is the principle source of
retirement beneﬁts. In other countries the social security system is only
one of the important sources of retirement support. In the United King-
dom and the Netherlands, for example, employer-provided pension plans
are a key source of beneﬁts. The same is true in the United States. In these
countries, some retirees receive deﬁned beneﬁts in the form of annuities
from employers as well as from the social security system. Indeed, in some
countries—such as the United States—the employer-provided beneﬁts are
often integrated with social security beneﬁts. The incentive eﬀects of these
private DB plans are very similar to those described above for social secu-
rity programs, as shown by Kotlikoﬀ and Wise (1988, 1989). Stock and
Wise (1990a,b) Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1990, 1991, 1992, 1994), and
Wise 1997show that the eﬀects on retirement are very similar as well. In-
deed, Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1997) show that social security and
employer-provided DB systems may interact in important ways. Thus it
may be important to consider public and private plans jointly.
The most dramatic change in retirement saving in the United States is
the conversion to individual retirement saving plans (IRAs, 401[k] plans,
and other), which are essentially the same as a voluntary version of per-
sonal social security accounts. Individuals must decide how much to con-
tribute to the accounts, how to invest the contributions, and how to with-
draw funds after retirement. In 1980, almost 92 percent of pension plan
contributions were to traditional employer-provided plans, and about 64
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most 60 percent of contributions are to personal retirement accounts, in-
cluding 401(k), IRA, and other plans. Including employer-provided (non-
401[k]) DC plans, more than 76 percent of contributions are to plans con-
trolled in large measure by individuals. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1998a,
b, 1999, 2000) show that for persons retiring three decades from now, per-
sonal assets in 401(k) plans alone are likely to be substantially greater than
social security plan wealth. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that
the personal control of retirement saving is progressing more quickly than
any resolution of the debate about social security personal accounts. Uni-
versal 401(k) coverage would indeed look much like a social security sys-
tem with personal accounts. The rapid spread of private personal accounts
should inform and aﬀect the discussion of social security personal ac-
counts. A large fraction of employees already are used to and know a great
deal about such accounts. In addition, the evidence on the saving eﬀect of
personal retirement accounts in the United States has been summarized
by Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1998c) and shows that the vast majority of
contributions to these accounts represents net new saving.13 It is likely that
personal social security accounts would have a similar saving eﬀect.
2.2.6 Political Constraints on Action
Although social security reform has occurred in many countries—Chile
and Mexico, for example—the political process in many countries makes
reform extremely diﬃcult. Although this is not the place to consider in
detail the enormous importance and complexity of this issue, it seems im-
portant to at least highlight it. Political action seems diﬃcult no matter
how large the problem or how imminent the crisis. Although many propos-
als have been made by economists or legislators with varying political
views, no reform is likely in the near future. In particular, no party wants
to take the risk of proposing reduced beneﬁts. In many European coun-
tries, where the ﬁnancial crisis is much greater than in the United States,
reform seems at least as diﬃcult to obtain and perhaps no nearer to taking
place. Here we have given little attention to this important matter, concen-
trating instead on potential reforms and their economic consequences.
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Comment Herbert Hax
Gruber and Wise present a clear and comprehensive analysis of the funda-
mental problems many pension systems face today, and of the political
obstacles to farsighted reforms. In particular, they have worked out the
two decisive shortcomings of a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system of the type
practiced in Germany. The ﬁrst is that such systems are highly sensitive to
changes of the dependency ratio (number of retirees to number of partici-
pants in labor force); this problem is aggravated by the second weakness,
the inherent incentive for early retirement.
In this case we are discussing pension systems with mandatory member-
ship. At the risk of stating the obvious, I wish to make clear at the outset
why mandatory membership in a pension system is regarded as necessary.
The ﬁrst and most convincing reason is that in a modern society no one is
left to starve; everyone is guaranteed a certain subsistence level through
public welfare. This concept is connected with moral hazard; individuals
with low income in particular might neglect saving for old age and rely
solely on welfare payments. A second reason may be that the pension sys-
tem is used as an instrument of redistribution—for instance, by ﬁnancing
pensions of those with lower incomes in part through higher contributions
of the more wealthy. The German system of redistribution favors families
with children. A third reason may be that a PAYGO system is not viable
without mandatory membership, although this is more an argument
against PAYGO systems than one in favor of mandatory membership.
I will not discuss here whether the pension system is a suitable means
for redistributing wealth, which is regarded as desirable. One of the reform
models currently being discussed in Germany provides a high degree of
redistribution by granting equal pensions to everyone, ﬁnanced by taxes
based on income; an advantage of this system is that it oﬀers a solution
for the moral hazard problem with a minimum of mandatory contribu-
tions. The present system in Germany is less redistributive insofar as pen-
sions depend in some way on the contributions paid by retirees during
their working lives.
Under certain circumstances, redistribution may have undesirable in-
centive eﬀects, but in principle we should accept redistribution so far as it
is explicitly wanted and is justiﬁed by a political value judgment. However,
it seems that many people are unaware that some pension systems have
unwanted distribution eﬀects that are not based on any recognized value
judgment; these intergenerational distribution eﬀects are inevitably con-
nected with a PAYGO system. In a stationary world in which the depen-
dency rate and productivity are constant, each generation would during its
working years pay, in form of contributions, the exact amount of pension
78 Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wisepayments they would later receive; the rate of return would be zero. Be-
cause many relevant parameters change over the course of time, however,
some generations may have high returns and others low or even negative
o n e s .T h i sn o to n l yi sa no ﬀense to fairness, but may also have a negative
eﬀect on the political acceptance of the system when members of a genera-
tion feel that they are treated unfairly. This is why pension systems in
several countries, including Germany, are facing a grave crisis.
Unwanted intergenerational distribution eﬀects can be avoided only in
a funded system. A pension system may be called funded if the implicit
debt resulting from accrued pension claims is covered by a capital stock.
A system may be fully or partially funded depending on the degree of
coverage. A fully funded system is not necessarily actuarially fair. It may
provide redistribution within each generation, even in the form of income-
dependent contributions and equal pensions; it can, however, reliably pre-
clude any unfair distortion of wealth among generations. In principle this
is also possible in a partially funded system, to the degree that shifts in
wealth from one generation to another can be avoided by ﬂuctuations of
the fund corresponding to ﬂuctuations of implicit debt. In a partially
funded system, however, the degree to which implicit debt is covered will
always be arbitrary, and discretionary interventions from the side of short-
term–oriented politicians cannot be ruled out.
To summarize my comments thus far, I add that, quite apart from other
advantages of funded systems (such as positive eﬀects on saving and capi-
tal formation), they have the merit of establishing fair intergenerational
distribution and thereby safeguarding the pension system against poten-
tially destructive stress.
GruberandWiserefertopoliticalconstraintsthat,althoughreformshave
been recognized as necessary and urgent, often stand in their way. To illus-
trate this, I will give some comments on the situation in Germany.
As Gruber and Wise point out, a grave default of the German system
is that it provides false incentives for early retirement by penalizing contin-
ued work. It may seem paradoxical, but the widespread political opinion
in Germany is that incentives for older workers to retire at younger ages
are not wrong at all. The argument behind this opinion is that high unem-
ployment in Germany is due to a shortage of jobs and that the adequate
cure can only be a reduction of labor supply. More precisely, there are two
related arguments:
● Because jobs are disposable only in a limited number, they should be
distributed more evenly among applicants, which can be brought
about by reducing individual working time (weekly or yearly working
hours) as well as the working period during lifetime.
● Because older people are much more frequently aﬀected by unem-
ployment than younger people, early retirement may be preferable to
(and, for the society as a whole, no more costly than) unemployment.
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labor is mistakenly regarded as constant, and one grave consequence is
that policy measures to enhance labor demand—including legal reforms
to provide more ﬂexibility in the labor market—are neglected. Further-
more, the incentive to retire at an earlier age is established not only for
those who would be unemployed in any case, but also for others: the still
large majority of those who have jobs. This results in a waste of human
capital, and may even have an adverse eﬀect on employment if employees
with special qualiﬁcations, who are not easily replaced, choose early re-
tirement.
We should not deny that unemployment among older workers is a seri-
ous problem and cause for increasing concern. The main reason seems to
be the accelerating process of technological and economic innovation,
which goes along with more rapid obsolescence of human capital. In many
professions, continuous renewal of human capital is essential for employ-
ees to meet changing demands. The problem of older workers is probably
not so much that their ability to learn deteriorates, but that with ap-
proaching retirement the motivation to invest in new human capital is
weakened. However, earlier retirement is not an adequate solution; its ef-
fect would only be an earlier onset of the weakening of motivation.
The solution of labor market problems is more than the pension system
can cope with. The joint approach of labor market policy and reform in
the pension system, as favored by inﬂuential institutions in Germany, leads
down a wrong path, particularly if it takes place at the expense of other,
more promising reforms in the labor market.
Although the merits of funded systems are recognized by the great ma-
jority of experts today, many politicians show great reluctance to accept
this insight; they have a marked preference for a PAYGO system. The plau-
sible explanation is that it is easy and (in the short term) very attractive to
enter into a PAYGO system and very diﬃcult and time-consuming to get
out of it. At the beginning the PAYGO system seems to oﬀer an easy
solution for problems that otherwise might cause trouble. The German
experience oﬀers a good example: When East Germany joined the Federal
Republic in 1990, some politicians were full of praise for the PAYGO sys-
tem, into which East Germany could be integrated without further ado.
Had there been a funded system, a long transition period would have been
inevitable, and in the meantime it would have been necessary to ﬁnd some
other way to ﬁnance old age payments in East Germany.
Today we in Germany strongly feel the shortcomings of the PAYGO
system, but politicians are repelled by the long period of transition into
a funded system, during which (for some time at least) a higher load of
contributions from taxpayers must be borne. The reaction of politicians is
to resort to easier expedients, such as ﬁnancing pension payments not only
out of the contributions to the pension system but partly out of other
taxes. This does not restore intergenerational fairness, of course, but it
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and tension, at least in the short run. Only very recently there seems to be
a growing insight that such expedients oﬀe ro n l yaw a yf r o mo n ec r i s i st o
the next. As the public is more aware than ever of the critical situation of
the pension system, it may be that chances for fundamental reform are not
as poor today as they were some years ago. There is some hope that the
models discussed by economists will be of more than academic interest.
Discussion Summary
Jeroen Kremers remarked that all the suggestions in the paper lean in the
direction of reform toward a funded system and posed the question of
whether more funded is better, or whether one should be aiming for an
optimal mix of a funded and a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system—for ex-
ample, one that allowed smoothing tax rates over time. Ignazio Visco also
inquired about the relevance of a multipillar system and asked what
weights the authors would give to PAYGO mandatory, and voluntary
funded elements, respectively. David A. Wise responded that it is diﬃcult
to deﬁne the optimal mix and that it would probably vary across countries.
He suggested that a deﬁned beneﬁt system might be responsible for provid-
ing a ﬂoor of beneﬁts that could contribute to the assurance that in con-
verting to a partially funded system people would not lose. Eytan Sheshin-
ski remarked that one problem with incremental reform is the lumpy
nature of costs involved in reform for setting up personal accounts and the
like. These costs would not be dependent on the size of accounts, and since
they were signiﬁcant (as could be seen from a number of countries like the
United Kingdom and Chile), this called for a drastic change rather than
an incremental one.
Pierre Pestieau raised the issue of redistribution and whether it will be
possible to have redistribution in a system like the one the paper proposes.
Martin Feldstein reported on work by Jeﬀrey Liebman that reveals that
there is much less actual redistribution in the U.S. system than appears
from the formulas, in signiﬁcant part because low-income workers tend to
die at relatively lower ages than higher-income workers, and they are there-
fore less likely to receive beneﬁts at all or else will have fewer years of
beneﬁts. He suggested that the focus in the context of pension reform not
be on redistribution per se but on reducing the risk of poverty in old age.
David A. Wise remarked that one could achieve any amount of redistribu-
tion in a funded system by setting it up in a particular way.
Pierre Pestieau noted that the principal nature of the problem of pen-
sion reform is a political one. He held that the problem in itself is not
aging, but all the entrenched interests that paralyze any kind of reform.
He argued that there would be no problem with aging if there were a social
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the political economy is the most conspicuously absent part of the frame-
work presented in the paper. He referred to the debate in Germany on
whether saving should be voluntary or mandatory in the transition to a
funded pillar. On the one hand, the aim was to avoid myopia, adverse
selection, and higher administrative costs related to a privately funded sys-
tem; on the other hand, polls showed that the solidarity with the current
system was very small, particularly among the young generations, and he
argued that it is extremely important to increase support for the system.
He concluded that it is arduous to design a voluntary transition without
losing the advantages of decreasing costs and running into the problems
that can be seen in the United Kingdom. David A. Wise acknowledged the
importance of political issues and suggested that they be addressed by
demonstrating that a funded system would produce beneﬁts that will be
no less than under the PAYGO system, and will likely be more.
Jeﬀrey Liebman commented on the proposition in the paper that a
funded system is supposed to increase national saving, whereas changes
within the PAYGO systems could not be expected to do so. He noted that
from an economic perspective this is not entirely clear, because introduc-
ing some sort of individual accounts could cause people to shift much of
their existing saving and not add to what is already saved. On the other
hand, he said, the prospect of a deteriorating PAYGO system that ulti-
mately will result in beneﬁt cuts or higher taxes would also induce people
to increase saving. Rolf Langhammer pointed to the possibility that the
income eﬀect of a higher rate of return dominates the price eﬀect of cur-
rent consumption relative to future consumption, and cited the experience
of a number of emerging-market countries and developing countries where
higher rewards per unit of saving have not fueled private saving but have
lowered private saving.
Pierre Pestieau remarked that the emphasis on the eﬀects of pension
reform on national saving present in the writings of many North American
authors is not adequate in the European context, where insuﬃcient na-
tional saving is not much of a problem. David A. Wise replied that the
required reduction in the consumption of the young in Europe is at least
as great as it is in the United States and that, consequently, the question
of how to accomplish this task with the least pain to the young applies at
least as much in Europe as it does in other countries.
Horst Siebert pointed out that there is not only a link between the pen-
sion system and unemployment insurance but a much closer link between
the pension system and the welfare state, resulting from the fact that there
is an income ﬂoor provided by the social welfare system. The level of this
ﬂoor was, of course, diﬀerent across countries; in the case of Germany, it
was around 50 percent of the worker’s income for singles and around 70
percent for married couples. If in such a situation the relative beneﬁt
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to create room for a funded pillar, this income ﬂoor would quickly be hit.
In that case, when beneﬁts out of the pension system after forty or forty-
ﬁve years of contribution were similar to those of social welfare payments,
very strange incentive eﬀects would result. According to Siebert, the prob-
lem of redesigning the old age pension system is also a question of rede-
signing the aspiration level that has been deﬁned by the welfare state, part
of which is the right to retire early without an actuarially fair cut in bene-
ﬁts. He concluded that part of the problem of pension reform in Europe
is the history of the welfare state, which poses some severe restraints for
an approach of switching to system which is at least partially funded.
Eytan Sheshinski asked whether there is a good argument not to increase
the early retirement age at the same time that the nominal retirement age
is increased, as has been the case in the United States. Another point he
made in that context was that early retirement is only one of a number of
options available to people. Others include disability and the welfare sys-
tem, so that there is eﬀectively a three-way margin. Accordingly, any anal-
ysis of the incentives to delay retirement should take all these other pro-
grams into account. Ignazio Visco reported that, according to OECD
estimates, eﬀective implicit tax rates on working beyond the age of 55 that
take into account the cumulation of incentives inherent in the various wel-
fare programs are generally high in European countries, at between 50 and
60 percent. In Italy before the recent reform it had even been 80 percent.
Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ remarked that the U.S. House of Representatives has
just voted to repeal the earnings test on the receipts of beneﬁts for workers
aged sixty-ﬁve to seventy and that also in the Swedish reform there is some
evidence of reducing disincentives to work longer years, indicating the pos-
sibility of a trend here. While he stressed the importance of the notion that
one of the major values of having a deﬁned contribution system is that it
naturally does not present these labor supply disincentives, he emphasized
that going from an unfunded to a funded system is not suﬃc i e n ti no r d e r
to achieve a more generationally balanced system. Reforms of this kind
often meant no more than a reduction in implicit debt and a simultaneous
increase in explicit government debt, so that workers were left with lower
payroll taxes in the future but higher taxes to cover the interest on the
explicit debt. Such a policy would not lower the burden on future genera-
tions.
A. Lans Bovenberg wondered about the causality of the correlation be-
tween the eﬀective tax rate on work and early retirement shown in ﬁgure
2.5. He pointed out that in many countries early retirement programs have
been the result of a weak position of workers in the labor market, and that
this suggests a correlation between labor market policies in general and
early retirement programs. From that he concluded that without a general
reform of inadequate labor market policies in Europe, early retirement
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moving in the right direction, he referred to the Netherlands, where labor
market policies have improved and now, as a consequence of an increas-
ingly tight labor market, people are starting to question these programs.
He reported that the average retirement age is already moving up and the
long-term trend is reversed, not so much because early retirement pro-
grams are changed but more because labor market policies in general have
been improved. Ignazio Visco added that labor market reform that would
increase the participation rates of older workers or the participation rates
of other groups, like women, might contribute to the alleviation of the
ﬁnancial balance of the public pension schemes, at least temporarily. Da-
vid A. Wise criticized the habit of taxing the old to remove them from the
labor force in order to provide work for the young as being founded on the
wrong assumption about the economy. He contended that unemployment
should be addressed through macroeconomic policies and not the social
security system. The latter policy would reduce the size of the economy
and increase tax rates on the young, thus reducing labor supply further.
Referring to the issue of causality, he noted that there is evidence of a
signiﬁcant relationship between changes in the rules and changes in retire-
ment—for example, in Germany and France, where changes in the social
security systems in the early 1970s had an enormous eﬀect almost imme-
diately. This, according to Wise, would be very diﬃcult to explain by re-
versed causality.
A. Lans Bovenberg questioned the proposition that it would not matter
greatly whether a pension system would be ﬁnanced by a social security
tax or other taxes. He maintained that there is an important diﬀerence in
the sense that a social security tax tends to be paid by the young only,
while all other taxes also tend to be shared by the elderly. Changing the
way the social security system is ﬁnanced would create the possibility of re-
ducing intergenerational redistribution and actually enhance intragenera-
tional redistribution by ensuring that the richer elderly also contribute to
the PAYGO system. Such a reform, he argued, could make the system
more sustainable.
George de Menil asked for a clariﬁcation with respect to ﬁgure F5, where
he suspected some special factors at work, as it can be observed that the
eﬀective tax rate on work in Germany at age sixty-ﬁve drops from 40 per-
cent to 5 percent before rising again with the retirement eﬀects. On the
whole, he argued, this would mean a huge incentive to work longer. Lau-
rence J. Kotlikoﬀ added the question of whether the numbers in this ﬁgure
include only the implicit tax associated with the pension system or all
taxes on labor supply. David A. Wise answered that the rates are relative
to net earnings after income tax and the like. He added that the peculiarity
in the German system was essentially of no relevance, merely a quirk in
the system, and that no one in Germany works at age sixty-ﬁve in any case.
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